We document that "persistent and lagged" in ‡ation (with respect to output) is a worldwide phenomenon in that these short-run in ‡ation dynamics are highly synchronized across countries. In particular, the average cross-country correlation of in ‡ation is signi…cantly and systematically stronger than that of output, while the cross-country correlation of money growth is essentially zero. We investigate whether standard monetary models driven by monetary shocks are consistent with the empirical facts. We …nd that neither the new Keynesian sticky-price model nor the sticky-information model can fully explain the data. An independent contribution of the paper is to provide a simple solution technique for solving general equilibrium models with sticky information.
Introduction
The nature of short-run in ‡ation dynamics is one of the most eminent issues in macroeconomics. It can be traced back in the literature to at least as early as Phillips (1958) . Although sophisticated, the modern incarnation of the sticky-price theory, based on the early work of Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983) , is incapable of explaining in ‡ation dynamics in two important aspects (as noted by Fuhrer and Moore, 1995) : First, it cannot explain the persistence in the in ‡ation rate. Second, it cannot explain why in ‡ation systematically lags output. The lack of in ‡ation persistence in the models implies that monetary policy can drive a positive rate of in ‡ation to zero with virtually no loss of output (see, e.g., Fuhrer and Moore, 1995) . It also implies that announced disin ‡ations can cause booms rather than recessions, which contradicts the historical experience of the U.S.
economy (Ball, 1994) . Further, the forward-looking property of the in ‡ation dynamics embodied in the standard sticky-price model implies that a policy of permanently falling in ‡ation can keep output permanently high. This implication is criticized by McCallum (1998) on the grounds that it violates a strict form of the natural rate hypothesis, according to which there is no in ‡ation policy that will keep output permanently high.
In response to this challenge, Mankiw and Reis (2002) develop a "sticky-information" model in which information di¤uses slowly throughout the population. This slow di¤usion could arise because of costs of acquiring information or costs of reoptimization. As a consequence, …rms' pricing decisions are not always based on current information. Mankiw and Reis show that a rational expectations monetary model featuring sticky information is capable of overcoming the aforementioned shortcomings of the sticky-price models. 1 The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, we ask whether the typical output-in ‡ation dynamics emphasized by the literature are a world-wide phenomenon. Our empirical investigation shows that the answer is "Yes". Just like in the U.S., in ‡ation in other industrial countries is also highly persistent and systematically lags output by several quarters. More importantly, we show that such in ‡ation dynamics are highly synchronized across countries. Namely, a high in ‡ation in the U.S. after an output boom is often associated with a high in ‡ation in Europe at the same time. This phenomenon of positive cross-country correlation in in ‡ation is linked to the fact that in ‡ation systematically lags output in each country and that output is positively correlated among countries. However, the data also indicate that the cross-country correlation of in ‡ation is much stronger than the cross-country correlation of output. For example, in our sample of 18 OECD countries, the average correlation of in ‡ation is about 0:6 while that of output is about 0:2. This fact alone, however, may not necessarily imply a low correlation in in ‡ations since business cycles can propagate across country borders even though they may be driven by country-speci…c monetary shocks. For this reason, the second purpose of our paper is to investigate whether standard monetary models with nominal rigidities can simultaneously account for the within-country output-in ‡ation dynamics and the cross-country output-in ‡ation correlations based on the calibrated international covariance of monetary shocks. We …nd the answer to be negative. Under country-speci…c money growth shocks, the models are not able generate strongly positively correlated in ‡ation rates across countries while maintaining their ability to account for the domestic output-in ‡ation relationship. This …nding casts doubt on the view that exogenous monetary shocks are the main driving force of short-run in ‡ation dynamics.
The third purpose of this paper, which can be viewed as an independent contribution to the literature, is to provide a simple solution technique to solve DSGE models with sticky-information.
While conceptually simple, a dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky-information is di¢ cult to solve. The di¢ culty arises because of the potentially large number of lagged expectation operators, which can create an extraordinarily large state space. In our method, variables with lagged expectations are replaced by their forecast errors with undetermined coe¢ cients. Hence the problem of a large state space is avoided (see Appendix B for details of our solution method). Given that the sticky-information model is becoming increasingly popular, we think this solution technique is a timely contribution to the literature, especially for those who want to estimate sticky-information models with a large number of lagged expectation operators by traditional econometric methods. 2 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We …rst present three stylized facts about short-run in ‡ation dynamics: (a) in ‡ation is highly persistent and it lags output within each country; (b) in ‡ation is strongly correlated across countries and the correlation is stronger than that of output; and (c) money growth is not signi…cantly correlated across countries. We then show that models with nominal rigidities and independent monetary shocks cannot simultaneously explain these stylized facts. Since the literature has already found that the sticky-information model is a good model to explain fact (a), we focus …rst on the sticky-information model's ability to explain fact (b). After showing that the sticky-information model cannot explain fact (b) without deteriorating its ability to explain fact (a), we then show that the same is true for sticky-price models as well.
Stylized Facts
We begin by looking at postwar in ‡ation dynamics for 18 developed countries. The data are from the IMF …nancial statistics and the OECD database (see Appendix A for detailed data descriptions).
The in ‡ation rates are computed based on the consumer price index (CPI). 3 We use the Band-Pass …lter to de…ne the output gap (business cycle components of GDP). The results are similar if the HP …lter is used instead. Some OECD countries have only seasonally unadjusted data available for prices and money stocks. In that case, seasonal adjustment by the X-11 …lter is performed whenever needed. Figure 1 graphs the domestic relationships (correlations) between output (y t ) and in ‡ation ( t ) for each of the individual countries in our sample, for leads and lags up to six quarters. Several patterns emerge from the graphs. First, the contemporaneous correlation between output and in ‡ation is positive for all individual countries except Norway and Portugal, where the correlation is zero. Second, in ‡ation systematically lags output. The maximum correlations between output and in ‡ation always take place at a lag k 0 for all of the 18 countries, with an average of k = 2:2 quarters. This is why the curves tend to be "z" shaped with a negative slope around k = 0. Letting j be the index for the 18 countries in alphabetic order (as in Figure 1 ), the number of periods that in ‡ation lags output for each country is given by the sequence fk j g = f 2; 2; 1; 3; 4; 4; 1; 2; 0; 0; 3; 1; 1; 4; 4; 2; 2; 3g :
3 Since CPI is not available in Germany until the 90s, we use the GDP de ‡ator for Germany. This lagged relationship of in ‡ation to output is not a consequence of the …lters used to extract the business cycle components (the Band-Pass …lter has no phase e¤ects on the time series). We also …nd a similar pattern if instead the HP …lter is used or the in ‡ation rates are not …ltered. 4 In ‡ation in each country is also highly persistent. If we measure the persistence of in ‡ation by its AR(1) coe¢ cient ( j ), where j is the country index, then the following sequence shows the distribution of the persistence in in ‡ation for the full sample: which has a mean of 0:77 with a standard deviation of 0:12. 5 It is well known that standard sticky-price models cannot explain the persistence in in ‡ation and the lead-lag relationships between output and in ‡ation. This inability of sticky-price models 4 Den Haan and Sumner (2004) use a VAR forecast errors method and they also …nd that output leads in ‡ation in the G7 countries. 5 If higher order processes are estimated, the persistence is even stronger. For example, based on AR(2) model, the average persistence (measured by the sum of the two coe¢ cients) is 0:84.
is the primary reason for Mankiw and Reis proposing to replace the New Keynesian sticky-price model with their sticky-information model. What is more interesting about the output-in ‡ation dynamics, however, is that the dynamic movements in in ‡ation are highly synchronized across individual countries. Namely, a high rate of in ‡ation in one country following an output boom is also associated at the same time with a high rate of in ‡ation in another country. For example, Table 1 reports the cross-country correlations of in ‡ation for the G7 countries based on CP I (numbers in parentheses are based on the GDP de ‡ator). It shows that the in ‡ation rates between any country pairs are positively correlated. The minimum value is 0:26 (between Germany and the USA), the maximum is 0:92 (between France and Italy). The sample average is 0:62. The information is summarized in the upper-left window in Figure 2 , which shows that, with no exceptions, in ‡ation ( ) is positively correlated across developed countries. The average of the correlations for the entire sample is 0:57.
This strong comovement in in ‡ation among countries is striking. It could be associated with the long-standing puzzle that output is positively correlated among countries. The upper right window in Figure 2 reveals that output (y) is also positively correlated across countries, but with the correlations signi…cantly weaker than those of in ‡ation. For example, the sample mean of the output correlations is only 0:18 (with a relatively large standard deviation of 0:29), while the sample mean of the in ‡ation correlations is 0:57 (with a relatively small standard deviation of 0:17).
In addition, the lower panel in Figure 2 shows the relationship between a country pair's in ‡ation correlation and the same country pair's output correlation for all of the 153 country pairs (each point on the graph represents one country pair with its in ‡ation correlation on the vertical axis and its output correlation on the horizontal axis). Two important patterns are worth noticing:
First, country pairs with higher cross-country correlations in in ‡ation also tend to have higher correlations in output (the slope of the regression line is 0:17, which implies a correlation of 0:41 between in ‡ation correlation and output correlation for the full sample of country pairs). Second and more importantly, the in ‡ation correlations are stronger than output correlations for most of the 153 country pairs because most of the points in the graph lie above the 45 line. 6 Figure 2. Synchronization in In ‡ation and Output.
The stylized fact that cross-country correlations in in ‡ation are signi…cantly positive and systematically higher than those of output is puzzling from the view point of real-business-cycle theory, according to which real shocks explain the international comovements in output, which in turn dictate the comovements in prices. Since in di¤erent countries in ‡ation lags output for di¤erent periods (as seen in Figure 1) , the cross-country correlations for output are thus expected to be higher than those for in ‡ation if movements in output drive the movements in prices (see the arguments in Kydland and Prescott, 1990). But the data indicate the opposite -namely, that in ‡ation correlations are much stronger than output correlations.
Oil shocks may be responsible for the cross-country in ‡ation comovements. To investigate this possibility, we have re-computed the cross-country correlations of in ‡ation using core in ‡ation, which is based on a measure of CPI excluding food and energy. The results are very similar. For 6 The international synchronization in output has been under intensive investigation by the real-business-cycle literature (see, e.g., Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1992) , but no consensus has been reached regarding the underlining forces of the output correlations (see Wen, 2005 , for a more recent analysis).
example, based on core in ‡ation, the average correlation of in ‡ation among all country pairs is 0:59 with a standard deviation of 0:16. 7 Hence the oil shocks, even if they are responsible, cannot be the full story behind the international synchronization in in ‡ation. 8 What are then the causes of this international synchronization in in ‡ation? A natural candidate is coordinated monetary policies among the developed countries. However, we document that movements in the money stock, measured either by currency in circulation, by total monetary reserves, by M1, or by the velocity of money are not signi…cantly or systematically correlated across countries. Table 2 Notice that in our sample many of the countries had their currencies pegged or linked to each other for signi…cant periods of the sample (i.e., during the European Monetary System), thus the 7 We have also examined shorter samples that exclude the …rst and second major oil shock periods in the 70s and the 80s, and we …nd that the cross-country correlations in in ‡ation are smaller but still signi…cantly and systematically stronger than those in output. 8 We are not the …rst in the literature to document the international synchronization in in ‡ation. Other people have also noticed that in ‡ation is highly correlated across countries, such as Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005), and Guo et al. (2006) . Our results, however, not only reinforce their …ndings from a di¤erent perspective, but also highlight a new stylized fact: in ‡ation correlations are signi…cantly and systematically stronger than output correlations across countries, regardless of which price index is used. 9 Countries like Finland, England, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium do not have M1 data over the full sample. We use the currency in circulation instead for these countries.
1 0 We also computed the cross-country correlations in the velocity of money and we found no evidence of signi…cant correlations across countries. For more details, see Section 5.4. in ‡ation rates of these countries may be tied to each other by policy. To check whether this has an important e¤ect on the stylized facts we presented, we have also divided our sample into two groups: Group 1 includes the EMU members and Group 2 includes the rest of the countries. The results are summarized in Table 3 . They show that both groups have similar degrees of cross-county correlations in in ‡ation, output, and money growth. In particular, money growth is not signi…cantly correlated while in ‡ation is highly correlated across countries within each group, regardless of which measure of money stock or price index is used. This suggests that the stylized facts we presented above are robust. 11 N u m b e rs in p a re nth e se s a re sta n d a rd e rro rs. G ro u p 1 in c lu d e s B e lg iu m , D e n m a rk , E n g la n d , Fra n c e , G e rm a ny, Ita ly, N e th e rla n d s,
P o rtu g a l, a n d S p a in . G ro u p 2 in c lu d e s A u stra lia , A u stria , C a n a d a , F in la n d , J a p a n , N e w Z e a la n d , N o rw ay, S w e d e n , a n d th e U S A . The existence of a signi…cant and systematic relationship among the in ‡ation rates and the 1 1 Since Sweden, Norway, and Austria did not join the EMU until 1996 and our data end in 1998, the three countries are included in the non-EMU member group. One possible explanation for the lack of signi…cant crosscountry correlations in money growth among the EMU members is that currencies among these countries are not exactly pegged, but linked with a fairly wide ‡oating band. simultaneous lack of a signi…cant and systematic relationship among the money growth rates are recaptured by the graphs in Figure 3 , where the top window shows the distribution of cross-country correlations of money growth, and the bottom window shows the relationship between the in ‡ation correlation and money growth correlation for each country pair in our sample (each country pair is represented by one point in the graph). The slope of the regression line in the bottom window is 0:004, which implies a correlation of 0:006. It suggests that the international synchronization in in ‡ation has little to do with coordinated monetary shocks across countries.
But this lack of a systematic relationship in money growth across countries does not necessarily imply that money is not responsible for the international comovements in in ‡ation, since country-speci…c monetary shocks may still be able to generate synchronized price movements across countries via some international propagation mechanism. Thus, if monetary shocks, as argued by both the New Keynesian sticky-price literature and the recent work of Mankiw and Reis, are truly responsible for the output-in ‡ation dynamics documented in Figure 1 , then the data suggest that there must exist a strong international transmission mechanism that can propagate countryspeci…c money shocks into synchronized price movements in neighboring countries. Are sticky prices or sticky information the culprit of the in ‡ation synchronization? This question is addressed in the following sections. Since the literature has already shown that sticky information is the better model for explaining the domestic in ‡ation dynamics, we examine its implications for cross-country comovements in in ‡ation …rst before turning to sticky prices.
The Benchmark Model

Firms
The benchmark model consists of two identical countries, called Home and Foreign (H and F ).
Assume that each country produces a single …nal good using intermediate goods and that only the …nal goods are tradable. The production function is given by:
where > given by
Each intermediate good i is produced by a single monopolistically competitive …rm according to the following technology, Y t (i) = N t (i). Intermediate good …rms face perfectly competitive factor markets, and are hence price takers. Pro…ts are distributed to households at the end of each period.
The real pro…t in period t is given by
, where M C t is the marginal cost, which is the same for all …rms. Under constant returns to scale, it is also the average cost.
Sticky Information. In each period, a fraction 1 of …rms update information about the state of the economy and set their optimal prices accordingly. The rest continue to set their prices based on old information. A …rm who updated its information j periods ago maximizes its pro…t by
The optimal price is given by P t (j) = E t j (P t YtM Ct) ( 1)E t j (P : According to Mankiw and Reis, the aggregate price level is given by
: Log-linearizing the above two equations,
we can obtain what Mankiw and Reis call the "sticky information Phillips Curve":
where t = log(P t =P t 1 ) denotes the in ‡ation rate. Clearly, in ‡ation in the sticky information model depends not only on current economic activities, but also on past expectations of current economic conditions.
Households
There is one representative household in each country and only one type of …nal good in the world.
In order to best capture the Mankiw-Reis idea in our general equilibrium model where money demand is endogenous, we assume that purchases of the …nal goods are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. We also assume that …nancial markets are complete, hence households can trade for a complete set of state-contingent bonds to borrow and lend. The bonds are denominated in home currency. The history of events realized up to period t is denoted by s t = (s 0 ; s 1 ; :::; s t ). The initial state, s 0 , is given. Let B(s t+1 ) denote the home household's holdings of a bond purchased in period t that pays one unit of the home currency in period t + 1 if state s t+1 occurs, and 0 otherwise. The price of this bond in units of the home currency is denoted by Q s t+1 js t . To simplify notation,
we denote x(s t ) x t for any variable after the realization of the state s t .
Consider the home country. In the beginning of each period t, based on the realization of s t , the household receives a money transfer in home currency in the amount X t ; and a payo¤ of B t additional units of home currency. Hence, the household's total nominal assets at the beginning of period t is M t + X t + B t ; where M t is the household's money holdings in home currency carried over from the last period, which is contributed from wage and pro…t income. Because of the cashin-advance constraint, the household needs home currency to purchase home goods and foreign currency to purchase foreign goods. Let M Ht denote the household's demand for home currency in period t, and M F t the household's demand for foreign currency in period t. Hence the household decides its portfolio of home and foreign currencies as well as future contingent bonds holdings according to the budget constraint:
where e = P P denotes the exchange rate, where P denotes foreign price. 12 After the portfolio choices, the currency market is closed. Namely, the household can no longer re-adjust its currency portfolio until the next period. The CIA constraints for the household's demand of home and foreign goods are given by
The household receives wage and pro…t income from intermediate good …rms after consumption and portfolio decisions. The law of motion for the household's money holdings is given by
The household maximizes lifetime utility,
subject to (3)-(6). Since there is only one type of …nal good, we have C = C H + C F ; which implies perfect substitutability between home goods and foreign goods.
Denote f t =P t ; 1t ; 2t ; t =P t g as the set of Lagrange multipliers for constraints (3)-(6), respectively. The …rst-order conditions for the choice of C Ht ; C F t ; M t+1 ; M Ht ; M F t ; N t ; B(s t+1 js t ) are given, respectively, by
where !(s t+1 js t ) is the conditional probability of s t+1 given s t :
The household in the foreign country has an analogous set of …rst-order conditions. In particular, with respect to bond choice, we have
These two conditions for contingent bonds imply perfect risk sharing:
Equilibrium Conditions
In equilibrium, all markets clear. Hence we have
where the …rst two equations are money market clearing conditions, and the last two are goods market clearing conditions. The money market clearing conditions state that total demand of home (foreign) currency by both domestic and foreign residents must add up to total supply of home (foreign) currency. The goods market clearing conditions state that total demand of home (foreign) goods by both domestic and foreign residents must add up to the total supply of home (foreign) goods. In addition, the CIA constraints must bind:
These CIA constraints and the market clearing conditions imply
which are identical to the money demand functions assumed in Mankiw and Reis (2002) . Note that e = P P , hence the …rst-order conditions with respect to C H and C F imply 1 = 2 = .
Note that W t P t N t + t = P t Y t ; and M t + X t = M t+1 , hence the budget constraint (6) implies
where N X t C Ht C F t is net exports. The above equation is the standard accounting equation that the current account (real net exports) plus the real capital account equals zero. This explains why the asset market portfolio constraint ( ) is written the way it is, since the household's total home currency holdings (M + X) may not equal its total money demand, M Ht + e t M F t . The household's excess demand of currency, M H + eM F (M + X) ; is precisely the home country's capital account, B P s t+1 Q(s t+1 js t )B(s t+1 ). Accordingly, we can also write the equilibrium CIA constraint as
Note that this CIA constraint is di¤erent from the conventional one assumed in the international economics literature since the conventional CIA constraint, C = M +X P , does not take into account net exports. It is also this di¤erence that makes the CIA constraint very di¤erent from a Money-inUtility speci…cation. We will discuss in a later section how this di¤erence is crucial to preserve the domestic output-in ‡ation dynamics of Mankiw and Reis (2002) in the two-country international model. Denote x i;t = log(M i;t+1 =M i;t ) as the growth rate of the nominal money stock for country i. Assume that home and foreign money growth follow a jointly stationary process:
where the innovations f" h ; " f g are uncorrelated i:i:d shocks with the same variance 2 .
Solution Method
The details of the method are described in Appendix B. Here we only brie ‡y discuss how to apply this method to solve the two-country sticky-information model. The most crucial step in the method is to transform endogenous variables with lagged expectations, E t j S t ; into j-step ahead forecast errors, S t E t j S t . To do so, we subtract ( t + w t ) from both sides of Equation (2) and rearrange terms to get 13
where the second term on the RHS is a weighted sum of j-step ahead forecast errors, which can always be expressed as functions of innovations in exogenous shocks. Thus, the lagged expected endogenous variables are replaced by exogenous forcing variables with undetermined coe¢ cients (since the decision rules are still unknown). With this new representation, we can then apply any conventional method, such as that of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) or King and Watson (1998) , to solve the model. In order to apply the general solution method outlined in Appendix B to solve the stickyinformation model, we also need to approximate the in…nite sum of j-step ahead forecast errors on the right-hand side of (26) by a …nite sum: 
Predictions
Calibration. The time period is a quarter. In order to best match the output-in ‡ation behavior of the closed-economy Mankiw-Reis model, we set the risk aversion coe¢ cient = 0:05; and the inverse labor supply elasticity n = 0:05. These parameter values are assumed because larger values tend to worsen the persistence of in ‡ation and its lagged relationship to output in the Mankiw-Reis model. 14 We set = 0:8; which is slightly larger than the value assumed by Mankiw and Reis but is needed in our model in order to generate good results. This value implies that it takes information …ve quarters to spread across the entire population after an initial shock. We …nd that the larger is, the more in ‡ation lags output. We set the time discounting factor = 0:99, and the elasticity of substitution parameter = 10 (implying a markup of about 10%) as in Mankiw and Reis. We assume that money growth follows an AR(1) process with persistence parameter = 0:6, which is 1 3 Notice that the real wage equals the real marginal cost, w = mc. 1 4 More discussions on this issue can be found in the robustness analysis in the next section.
consistent with Mankiw and Reis and much of the sticky-price literature. 15 The parameter values are summarized in Table 4 . Impulse Responses. Figure 4 graphs the impulse responses of output, consumption, the real wage, and the in ‡ation rate for both the home and foreign countries. The intuition for the impulse response patterns of home and foreign countries can be understood as follows. After an unexpected monetary growth increase at home, real wealth increases, hence consumption in both countries increases due to risk sharing. Since leisure is a normal good, the labor supply curve shifts backward in both countries, which leads to a higher real wage. In order to …nance the higher consumption demand both at home and abroad, production must increase either at home or abroad, or both. But a higher production in the foreign country is not an equilibrium since that implies an outward shift of the labor demand curve, which causes the real wage to further increase in the foreign country.
A higher real wage implies a higher marginal cost of labor, hence a higher price level set by …rms.
This implies that the aggregate price level must also go up in the foreign country. The increased output combined with an increased price level implies a higher demand for money. But this cannot be an equilibrium since the foreign money supply has not changed. Thus output in the foreign country must decrease. Therefore, output in the home country must go up, which implies a much higher real wage and in ‡ation rate at home. At the same time, since output in the foreign country decreases, the aggregate price level must increase to balance money demand with money supply 1 5 A larger value of also tends to generate more lagged in ‡ation relative to output.
in the foreign country. A lower output in the foreign country also implies a downward shift of the labor demand curve, which explains why the real wage in the foreign country does not increase as much as it does at home. Thus, in the initial impact period, the Mankiw-Reis sticky-information model is able to explain the comovements in in ‡ation across countries under monetary shocks. However, as time goes by, while in ‡ation at home gradually returns to zero because the shock to money growth is not permanent, in ‡ation in the foreign country must become negative before returning to zero. This is because the foreign price level must eventually return to the steady state. If in ‡ation is always non-negative, it would imply a permanently higher price level in the long run in the foreign country.
Due to this dynamic in ‡ation reversal in its transitional dynamics in the foreign country, the overall cross-country correlation of in ‡ation is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, since the initial positive correlation is o¤set by later negative correlations.
Notice that the in ‡ation rate is highly persistent and it lags output both at home and abroad.
Under our parameter calibration, the predicted persistence is h = 0:98 for the Home and f = 0:89 for the Foreign country. The predicted lag period is k h = 2 for the Home and k f = 3 for the Foreign country. These predictions are consistent with the data presented in Section 2. But, regarding the cross-country correlation in in ‡ation, the model predicts corr( h ; f ) = 0:01, which is not signi…cant at all. However, a higher correlation can be generated from the model if we reset the parameter to a much higher value. Higher values of ; unfortunately, completely destroy the lead-lag relationship between output and in ‡ation, deteriorating the model's prediction on other dimensions. 16 Furthermore, the predicted cross-country correlation for output is always negative.
This negative correlation in output is a robust feature of the model. For this reason, the following robustness analyses focus on in ‡ation only.
Robustness Analysis
Money-in-Utility
We consider several robustness analyses with respect to the low cross-country correlation of in ‡ation implied by the sticky-information model. 17 First, we show that a quantity relationship in terms of aggregate demand (not just consumption), P Y = M , is crucial for the sticky-information model to explain the persistent and lagged in ‡ation dynamics. Hence, adopting other speci…cations of money demand will not improve the model. In particular, if the money-in-utility (MIU) speci…cation is used instead, the model not only is unable to explain the persistent and lagged in ‡ation movements with respect to output, but also implies a strongly negative cross-country correlation for in ‡ation.
For example, based on the calibrated parameters reported in Table 4 , the cross-country correlation predicted by MIU is 0:74. The intuition for the negative cross-country correlation in in ‡ation is that under the MIU speci…cation, consumption and real balances always move together within each country. Since a home-money injection leads to higher consumption both at home and abroad under risk sharing, demand for real balances also increases in the foreign country. This must imply a lower price level in the foreign country (since the money supply is …xed in that country) and hence a negative cross-country correlation in in ‡ation.
Since the conventional CIA constraint in terms of consumption only, P C M , is just a special case of MIU, a CIA speci…cation in terms of consumption su¤ers from the same problems as the MIU speci…cation. Thus, in order for the Mankiw-Reis model to generate persistent and lagged in ‡ation dynamics consistent with the data in general equilibrium, and at the same time also generate non-negative cross-country correlations in in ‡ation, a general CIA constraint in terms of aggregate demand (C + N X) must be imposed. For the same reason, if capital is included in the model, the CIA constraint must also include investment (see below).
Pricing Complementarity
Woodford (2003) shows that allowing for strong pricing complementarity can enhance in ‡ation persistence in models with nominal rigidities. In particular, if the household's utility function is modi…ed to
then even large values of and n can generate highly persistent and hump-shaped in ‡ation.
The reason for this is as follows. With the modi…ed utility function on leisure, the log-linearized monopolist pricing rule is given by
where R t denotes the nominal interest rate. 18 In the earlier model, the pricing rule is given by
Since persistence in in ‡ation requires that monopoly prices be insensitive to aggregate demand, small values of and n are required to generate persistent in ‡ation in the earlier model. In the current model, since (1 + n ) appears in the numerator and is large, the requirement for small values of and n is no longer needed. Thus, even under large values of and n , in ‡ation can be persistent and hump-shaped. However, notice that the two models are the same when n = 0.
Hence for small values of n , the two models' implications are similar. On the other hand, large values of n in the current model are equivalent to small values of and n in the earlier model, hence the implied cross-country correlation in in ‡ation remains small in the current model for large values of n . For example, when = n = 1, the implied cross-country correlation of in ‡ation is 0:05; and when = 1; n = 6:7, the implied correlation is 0:009. 19 
With Capital
The literature has shown that adding capital to sticky-price models can signi…cantly deteriorate the dynamic properties of the models with respect to in ‡ation persistence (see, e.g., Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan, 2000). We show here that adding capital to the benchmark sticky-information model does not change the model's predictions signi…cantly, as long as the CIA constraint is speci…ed in the general form that applies to all components in aggregate demand, C + I + N X M=P , where I denotes investment. 20 In particular, impulse response analysis shows that in ‡ation remains highly persistent and lagging output both at home and abroad. Also, similar to the case without capital, 1 8 Namely, Rt 1 + t = t, where and denote Lagrange multipliers as in the benchmark model. 1 9 These values imply The depreciation rate of capital is set to = 0:025. Also see Table 3 for parameter calibrations in this model. the cross-country correlations in in ‡ation are not signi…cant because the foreign in ‡ation rate reverses itself to negative shortly after an initial increase, while the home in ‡ation rate remains positive until the shocks die out. For example, based on the calibrated parameters reported in Table 4 , the implied cross-country correlation of in ‡ation is 0:07. The in ‡ation reversal takes place because the price level in the foreign country has to return back to its steady state in the long run. In other words, with the money supply held constant in the foreign country, the accumulated changes in in ‡ation must sum to zero. Thus, if any model is able to generate hump-shaped in ‡ation persistence in one country under country-speci…c money growth shocks, then it must also imply a lack of strong cross-country correlations in in ‡ation because of the necessary in ‡ation reversal in the other country. This general statement holds true in all models with nominal rigidities regardless of capital.
Money Demand Shocks
Suppose the source of monetary disturbances comes from money demand or from the level of the money supply, instead of money growth. Then the model is able to generate signi…cantly positive cross-country correlations in in ‡ation. For example, let the household in each country face modi…ed CIA constraints in each period,
where D H;t and D F;t are random variables with zero mean, which represent shocks to money demand. In a log-linearized world, they are also equivalent to shocks to the velocity of money.
The additive property of D H;t and D F;t simpli…es the household's …rst-order conditions. Thus, all …rst-order conditions of the household remain the same as in the benchmark model. Consequently, in equilibrium we have
Denote . We assume that money demand shocks follow an AR(1) process for each country,
Since d t also measures the negative of the velocity of money, we can use data from our sample to calibrate the process of money demand shocks. We …nd that the cross-country correlations of money demand shocks are essentially zero.
The sample mean of the correlations for all country pairs is 0:18 with a standard deviation of 0:27 under the band-pass …lter (the sample mean is 0:13 with a standard deviation of 0:17 under the HP …lter). 21 The sample mean of the AR(1) coe¢ cients is 0:7 under the HP …lter and 0:93 under the band-pass …lter. The e¤ects of money demand shocks on in ‡ation can be summarized as follows.
First, regardless of the value of d , the predicted volatility of in ‡ation relative to output is too small to match the data. For example, the volatility ratio ( , having a model with both types of shocks are unlikely to solve the problems since the movements of in ‡ation under money supply shocks dominate those under money demand shocks. 22 
Endogenous Money Rule
Monetary policy shocks may take place in the form of interest rate shocks instead of money growth shocks, and this may imply a di¤erent cross-country propagation mechanism with respect to in ‡a-tion. For this reason, we also consider endogenous monetary policy shocks to the Taylor rule:
where i t represents the nominal interest rate and v it = i v it 1 + " it represents shocks to monetary policy. Our analyses show that regardless of the values of the Taylor rule parameters, the crosscountry correlation of in ‡ation is always negative under independent shocks to the interest rate 2 1 The fact that the cross-country correlations are high for in ‡ation but not for output, money supply, and the velocity of money appears to be puzzling based on the identity, py = vm. This can be explained by the fact that output is more volatile than prices, hence if nominal GDP is not highly correlated across countries (due to a weak correlation in output), then so is the e¤ective supply of money. Indeed, the estimated cross-country correlations for nominal GDP are weak (the sample average is 0:17). This explains why the velocity of money is not highly correlated (given that money stock is not highly correlated) across countries.
(i.e., corr(" h ; " f ) = 0). For example, based on the calibrated parameters reported in Table 4 , the implied cross-country correlation of in ‡ation is 0:56. Although correlated shocks may resolve this problem, the model does not perform well in explaining the domestic output-in ‡ation relationship.
For example, in order to generate highly persistent and hump-shaped in ‡ation within a country, not only do the shocks need to be highly persistent (e.g., i = 0:95), but also the interest rate elasticities to output and in ‡ation need to be relatively large (e.g., y = 0:5; = 1:6). But in this case, domestic output is negatively correlated with domestic in ‡ation, which is inconsistent with the data. If the interest rate elasticity parameters are chosen such that the domestic output-in ‡ation correlation becomes positive, in ‡ation then stops being persistent and hump-shaped.
The intuition of the negative cross-country in ‡ation correlation is as follows. A negative home interest-rate shock is equivalent to a money injection at home. Hence it implies a higher price level at home (positive in ‡ation). Consumption in both countries will increase due to risk sharing. In the foreign country, in ‡ation must be negative since a positive in ‡ation cannot be an equilibrium.
Under the Taylor rule, a positive in ‡ation implies an even higher nominal interest rate, which implies an increase in the real interest rate in the foreign country. This higher real rate induces agents to save more and consume less, contradicting the original consumption increase. This explains the negative cross-country correlation of in ‡ation. Under Taylor rules the output response in the foreign country must be negative because a positive output response implies a higher labor demand, which increases the marginal cost and consequently the price level, hence contradicting the conclusion that the in ‡ation response in the foreign country is negative.
Correlated Money Supply Shocks
All of the previous robustness analyses regarding di¤erent model variations indicate that independent money growth shocks generate negative cross-country correlations in output and zero (or negative) cross-country correlations in in ‡ation, in sharp contrast to the stylized facts reported in Section 2. This subsection investigates whether correlated money shocks are able to improve the sticky-information model in accounting for the data. The results are summarized in Table 5 . In the table, m denotes the cross-country correlation in money growth shocks assumed in each of the model variations considered above, and y ; denote the implied cross-country correlations in output and in ‡ation, respectively. For the model variation with money demand shocks considered in Section 5.4, m is replaced by~ d , which denotes the assumed value for the cross-country correlation in money demand shocks. The other parameters of the models are calibrated as in Table   4 . Table 5 indicates that in order for the sticky-information model to match the average crosscountry correlation in in ‡ation (0:6) observed in the data, highly correlated money growth shocks with a cross-country correlation around 0:6 are needed for the benchmark model and the model with pricing complementarity. In this case, the two models are also able to generate signi…cant cross-country correlation in output. However, the MIU model and the model with the Taylor rule are still unable to explain the cross-country correlations in output and in ‡ation even when the cross-country correlation of money growth shocks is as high as 0:8. Notice that under a realistic value of the cross-country correlation in money growth (0:1 0:2), none of the models listed in Table 5 are able to explain the strong correlations in in ‡ation across countries. For example, when m = 0:2, the largest value for the in ‡ation correlation is 0:24, which is obtained in the model with pricing complementarity. 23 However, the model with money demand shocks (the …fth panel in Table 5 ) is able to generate strong cross-country correlations in output and in ‡ation. For example, when~ d = 0:2, the predicted correlation is 0:18 for output and 0:60 for in ‡ation, matching the data closely. Unfortunately, as explained in Section 5.4, money demand shocks are not able to generate a su¢ ciently volatile in ‡ation rate. Thus, in a model with both money supply shocks and money demand shocks, it is still unable to explain the data because the e¤ect of money supply shocks dominates that of money demand shocks. For example, the last panel in Table 5 
Fixed Exchange Rate
Although the data (Table 3 ) suggest that the cross-country correlations in in ‡ation and money growth are similar regardless of the exchange rate system, it is nonetheless interesting to consider whether the sticky-information model is able to generate a su¢ ciently large correlation in in ‡ation with only mild correlations in money supply when money demand shocks are present. Since purchasing power parity (PPP) holds in the model, a …xed exchange rate requires that in ‡ation in the foreign country equals in ‡ation in the home country. The Phillips curve then implies that the real wage is the same across countries. Due to perfect risk sharing, Equation (10) then implies that the Lagrangian multiplier ( ) for constraint (3) is the same across countries. Based on these, Equation (13) implies that the output level is the same across countries. The money market equilibrium
Suppose that the foreign country pegs its exchange rate. This equation suggests that the foreign country's money growth is endogenously determined by the home country's money growth shocks and the di¤erence between the two countries'money-demand growth rates.
Assuming that both countries have similar money demand shocks and all shocks are independent, the cross-country correlation of money supply is then determined by
, where
u is the standard deviation of monetary-supply growth and d is the standard deviation of moneydemand growth. Since
In the data the variances of monetary demand and money supply are almost the same, hence Equation ( . Such a high correlation of money growth is not supported by the data. Alternatively, Equation (27) can also be written as
For di¤erent values of m , Equation (28) implies di¤erent values of the variance ratio between money demand and money supply shocks. In the data, m ' 0:1. Based on this, the required variance ratio is 83 under a …xed exchange rate. Table 5 shows that under a ‡exible exchange rate, a variance ratio of 100 can generate a cross-country in ‡ation correlation of about 0:17. Here, under a …xed exchange rate, it only needs a variance ratio of 83 to generate a perfect cross-country correlation in both in ‡ation and output. This shows that a linked exchange rate can improve the model's performance. However, the required variance ratio is still too high to be consistent with the data. In addition, as shown in Table 3 , countries without linked exchange rates also tend to have a high correlation in in ‡ation and low correlation in money growth. Therefore, even if linked exchange rates could explain the data associated with the EMU countries, there would still remain the challenge to explain the data associated with the non-EMU countries.
Sticky Prices
In a standard Calvo-type sticky-price model, the Phillips curve equation (2) is replaced by the following form:
which shows that in ‡ation depends on the current expectation of future economic variables instead of on lagged expectations of economic variables. In this model, output and in ‡ation lack persistence and in ‡ation does not lag output. For this reason, it is rejected by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Mankiw and Reis (2002) as a candidate for understanding in ‡ation dynamics. However, under the general form of the CIA constraint in terms of aggregate demand (C + N X M=P ), a sticky-price model is able to generate hump-shaped output persistence and explain the positive cross-country correlations in in ‡ation, as the top panel in Figure 5 shows. As is also clear from the graph, however, the model cannot simultaneously explain the positive cross-country correlation in output, the hump-shaped in ‡ation dynamics, and its lagged relationship with output. 24 In The bottom panel in Figure 5 shows that the hybrid model fails to predict positive crosscountry correlations for in ‡ation. As in the sticky-information model, although it can successfully predict hump-shaped in ‡ation and its lagged relationship with output within each country, the predicted cross-country correlation in in ‡ation is negative ( 0:28). In addition, the predicted output correlation remains negative. Similar to the sticky-information model, the results are very robust to parameter perturbations and model modi…cations. The reasons for the failure are the same as in the sticky-information model. Thus we conclude that sticky-price models, just like stickyinformation models, cannot simultaneously explain the within-country output-in ‡ation dynamics and the cross-country output-in ‡ation synchronization.
Conclusion
In this paper, we document stylized facts about output, in ‡ation, and money using a cross-county analysis. We show that 1) persistent in ‡ation and its lead-lag relationship with output are a common feature of developed economies; 2) such in ‡ation dynamics are highly synchronized across countries with the cross-country correlations in in ‡ation signi…cantly and systematically stronger than those in output; and 3) changes in money stocks are not signi…cantly correlated across countries. Since conventional wisdom attributes short-run in ‡ation dynamics to monetary shocks, these stylized facts (especially 2 and 3) appear to be puzzling. We investigate whether monetary models with nominal rigidities can explain these stylized facts simultaneously. We …nd the answer to be negative.
The inability of the monetary models to explain the stylized facts simultaneously is robust to model variations, such as endogenous monetary policy, di¤erent speci…cations of money demand, the presence or absence of capital, …xed exchange rates, and allowing for money demand shocks. Thus, we conclude that the short-run output-in ‡ation dynamics and their strong synchronization across countries are unlikely a monetary phenomenon. The attempt to use monetary shocks to explain output-in ‡ation dynamics could be misguided. 25 Whether non-monetary shocks are responsible for these stylized facts, however, is a challenging topic for further research. According to our sub-sample analysis, the major oil shocks in the 0 70s and the early 0 80s may be partially responsible for the strong international comovements in in ‡ation. But they cannot be the whole story since samples excluding the energy prices and the major oil shock periods also show signi…cant international synchronization in in ‡ation. In addition, it is not clear that oil shocks can simultaneously explain the within-country output-in ‡ation dynamics. What is clear, however, is that understanding the sources of the international synchronization in in ‡ation is important both for developing monetary models and for designing monetary policy.
Appendix A This appendix describes the data source and data range. For within country statistics, we use the full sample available for each country. For cross-country statistics, we choose the common sample 2 5 The correlation between money growth and in ‡ation within a country is weak in the data. Fitzgerald (1999) , however, shows that the correlation is strong in the longer run (e.g., beyond a two-year horizon). This notwithstanding, our purpose in this paper is to use a cross-country analysis to scrutinize the view commonly held in the monetary literature that monetary shocks are the key driving force of short-run in ‡ation dynamics in each country. If this view is correct, then monetary shocks should also be responsible for the cross-country comovements in in ‡ation. Our analysis shows that this is not the case.
dynamic system of equations:
where fA; B; i ; i = 1; 2; :::g are k k coe¢ cient matrices. System (1) can be solved in several steps:
Step 1. Express the forecast error S t E t i S t for i 1 as a …nite moving average process with undetermined coe¢ cients f i g N 1
i=0
. Since the solution for S t should take the form S t = P 1 i=0 i " t i ; where i is k 1, we have S t E t i S t = P i 1 j=0 j " t j ; for i = 1; 2; :::; N: Using this property to substitute out E t i S t by their forecast errors, Equation (1) can be rearranged into
where is a N k N matrix with i as its diagonal elements, and t " 0 t ; " 0 t 1 ; :::; " 0 t N +1 0 N 1
:
Step 2. Solve Equation (2).
Equation (2) is a standard system of linear di¤erence equations without lagged expectations.
Hence we can solve the system with standard methods such as those proposed by Blanchard and and M ( ) are coe¢ cient matrices that depend on the undetermined coe¢ cient matrix .
Step 3. Solve for f 0 ; 1 ; :::; N 1 g :
Denote the state vector Q t Y 0 t Z 0 t 0 t 0 . The equilibrium decision rules and law of motion are recaptured asX t = H( )Q t and Q t+1 = M ( )Q t + G" t+1 : Hence, the forecast errors are given by
for i = 0; 1; 2; :::; N 1: Equation systems (4) and (3) can be stacked into the following form after leaving out the exogenous variables t from the bottom rows in equation system (3):
By de…nition we also have
Recall that is a diagonal super matrix with j (j = 0; 1; :::; N 1) as its diagonal elements.
Clearly, the equivalence of system (6) and system (5) constitutes kN equations with kN unknowns in f j g N 1 j=0 . In particular, for i = 1; 2; :::N , a term-by-term comparison between (5) and (6) for all of the coe¢ cients of " t i suggests that P 0 ( ) = 0 , P 1 ( ) = 1 ; :::; P N 1 ( ) = N 1 , which can be compactly expressed as P ( ) = : The solution for the vector sequence f i g N 1 i=0 can thus be found as a …xed point. Although analytical solutions exist, it can also be solved numerically using standard packages in Gauss or Matlab.
